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Because cosmology touches our ideas about what lies “beyond” as 
much as about what went “before”, it will always raise controversy 
and even cause bitterness. Although I am a classical astrophysicist, I 
reckon that even in the solar spectrum, some elements† indicate some 
general principle of the universe. At the same time, another universe 
than that of the astrophysicists is offered by mathematicians  who 
conceive all sorts of objects and geometries. But there is too great a 
temptation to consider these constructions “real”, as soon as they are 
plausible. 
As a fellow astrophysicist, I see the universe in the same way as 
Professor Rees. His description of the modern progress of astronomy 
and cosmology cannot be more balanced, subtle and precise. I would 
certainly not try to contradict him on the facts, even though some 
astronomical observations such as “abnormal” redshifts cannot help 
                                                        
* Nobel Symposium, 1986, Stockholm, Possible worlds in Arts and Science 
(Discussion of Martin Rees’s paper) 
† Such as the displacement of solar spectral lines with respect to their ideal 
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but remain in question. Instead, I would like to discuss the more 
controversial, because speculative, notions he discusses, those of 
cosmological facts, the Big Bang and the anthropic principle. 
The cosmological facts 
As Professor Rees makes clear, one fact has determined our 
cosmological concepts: Hubble’s discovery of relationship between 
the spectral redshift of a given extragalactic object and its distance 
from us. Modern determinations of distances allows to say 
quantitatively that expansion is apparently going on at a rate‡ of 
Ho = 50 to 100 km/sec per Mpc. The most likely value for the 
deceleration parameter qo is ½, which corresponds to a flat universe. 
But all measurements are in fact quite dispersed around this value, 
and seem now to indicate an open universe. 
Two other cosmological facts are related to the Big Bang theory. 
The second cosmological fact often quoted and extensively discussed 
by Rees is that on earth we are immersed in a cosmic microwave 
background radiation, like being in a furnace kept at a temperature of 
t0 = 2.7 Kelvin. This accidental discovery seemed to confirm the so-
called Big Bang model for theorists. The third cosmological fact 
depends on the measurement of elementary abundances in the 
universe, and it seems that the proportions of hydrogen, deuterium, 
helium, lithium, etc., have changed little since their formation at the 
time of the Big Bang. 
Needless to say, when one discovers several facts which fit within 
the same theory, one is tempted not to go beyond and to relegate all 
other facts to secondary importance. And theory begins to act like one 
is led to be satisfied by Occam’s famous razor that seemingly cuts 
through all the difficulties. It seems to me however that we have gone 
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a bit too far in this direction, and that many other facts should also be 
reconsidered as of cosmological importance. I have referred only to 
the solar spectrum, but they are many other examples. Hence, the 
selection of those observed facts which could be labeled “of 
cosmological significance” is somewhat arbitrary. Could not another 
set of choices have led to confirm some other cosmology? 
The hierarchical universe 
A fact which can be considered as one of the most important ones for 
cosmology, and which has been known since Kepler (although 
mathematically formalized only by de Cheseaux, and named after 
Olbers) is that the starry night is black and not luminous like the solar 
surface. As a matter of fact, “Olbers paradox” (Jaki, 1969) shows that, 
within a Euclidean universe that is supposedly uniformly filled with 
stars, and where the apparent brightness of a light source decreases 
with the inverse of the square of the distance, the sky should be 
uniformly bright at all times, and as bright as the surface of an 
average star like the Sun. 
The Big Bang model has been considered to solve Olbers paradox. 
Integration ad infinitum would not be legitimate, since we have to 
take into account a “horizon” which is in fact the one existing in the 
epoch of the Big Bang, before which there was no star or galaxy to be 
seen. In other words, the observable universe can be considered as 
necessarily finite. 
But this cannot be quite correct. The inflationary universe, meant 
to explain the quasi-isotropy of the background radiation, has 
introduced a horizon which encompasses a much larger mass than the 
standard Big Bang model does; and the horizon is pushed back to 
times where sky brightness was indeed very high.   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  4 
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But is the Big Bang the only solution? Fournier d’Albe, in a 
strange but far-reaching construction, and later Charlier (1908, 1922), 
introduced, in order to solve the Olbers paradox, the idea of a 
hierarchical and infinite universe, where the density averaged over a 
volume of radius R would decrease with R. If it decreases quicker 
than a law in R
–1, the divergence of the brightness integral does not 
occur. This can be expressed by requiring that the mass distribution in 
the universe be a fractal distribution of index N < 2 rather than the 
index 3 of a uniformly filled volume (the relation M proportional to 
R
3 being then valid; in a fractal distribution of index N, the relation 
between M and R is M proportional to R
N, according Mandelbrot, 
1977). 
A classical static model, quasi-Euclidian and obviously open, 
considering the black sky as a fact, allows us to predict that mass 
distribution in the Universe is sufficiently hierarchized. What do we 
observe? Strangely enough, as shown by de Vaucouleurs (1970) the 
observable part of the Universe is indeed hierarchized and can be 
described by a fractal distribution of index 1.3, that accounts well for 
Olbers paradox. 
From white dwarfs to the Lick stellar counts, over about 25 orders 
of magnitude in distance, this hierarchy satisfies Charlier’s condition. 
The Big Bang imposes an end on this hierarchy practically at the 
point we have now reached. It is certainly possible that it continues 
further, but how to be sure? We thus have here an observed fact that 
was predicted by the steady-state theory, and verified forty years later. 
But, as true as it seems, we must still admit that the Big Bang explains 
the facts just as well! 
We meet similar difficulties with another type of paradox, derived 
from a nineteenth century paper by Seeliger. If the observable mass of 
the universe is infinite, tides produced on Earth by the most remote 
part of it would completely overcome lunar tides, and put us in an   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  5 
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exploding condition. Fortunately, nothing of that sort happens! It may 
mean that the Universe is finite, in agreement with the Big Bang 
theory, but it puts a strong constraint on it. Notably, it may force us to 
doubt present-day views about the inflationary universe. 
Other “facts” are the existence of relations between redshift and 
angular size, or between redshift and magnitude, or the counts of 
galaxies with varying magnitudes, or counts with different various 
radio b rightnesses. Such relations were considered by Hubble and 
Tolman as physical tests of expansion, and they have been taken up 
again recently by Pecker (1986) and LaViolette (1986). The latter 
finds that they indicate tired-light mechanisms more than an 
expanding model. Within the reference frame of expansion, the tests 
could probably be interpreted in terms of evolution, with highly 
redshifted objects (i.e., representative objects of a young universe) 
being possibly affected by the evolution of the universe as a whole. 
But should we go along with a logic that starts with the Big Bang 
as if it were indisputable? I remember a sentence from one of the 
Perry Mason mysteries I read when travelling in California: 
Mason said nothing, kept on pacing the floor. Suddenly he 
whirled:  -We’re all making the most asinine of all 
fundamental errors!  -What’s that, Chief? Della Street 
asked. -We’re looking at the thing from the stand point of 
the Prosecution. The Prosecution reconstructed the crime 
and we’re falling right in with their reconstruction. Let’s 
go back to first principles. Let me see those photographic 
exhibits, Della...    
  (Gardner, 1952). 
So let us return instead to Einsteinian logic, although we could as 
well comment on other cosmologically disturbing facts, such as 
quasar distribution (Fliche, et al., 1982, Depaquit et al. 1985) and the   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  6 
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arguments for abnormal redshifts (see Pecker 1976; Chu et al. 1984; 
Arp 1972, 1976). 
Static cosmology 
After Einstein developed General Relativity in 1916-1917, he decided 
to solve the GR equations in order to derive a model of the Universe. 
At the base of his model lies, however, the  a priori  idea of a 
stationary universe that had existed forever and would continue to 
exist; Pecker and Vigier (1976) described this universe more recently 
as “statistically stable and locally fluctuant” and as never in 
equilibrium, but everlasting. But Einstein could not know of Hubble’s 
observations. 
The only way to solve the GR equations appeared then to 
introduce a cosmological constant that would imply a repulsive action 
of gravitation at large distances. The static solution was then possible, 
with the cosmological constant explaining some aspects of the 
structure of the Universe. Truly enough, the Einstein’s Universe is not 
stable unless empty, as  several people have shown, Eddington in 
particular. But our statement about hierarchy does not rule out 
average emptiness; if the hierarchical law described above were 
universally valid, the average density of the universe would be equal 
to nought and the universe would be flat on a large scale. Moreover, 
assuming Einstein’s point of view, the horizon would be infinitely 
remote. Such a Universe can account for background radiation, 
assuming a long-time equilibrium between matter and radiation; and 
it can account for observed chemical compositions, although at the 
expense of local mechanisms, only after considering the long but 
finite lifetimes of particles. 
But what about Hubble’s law? In a stationary universe, either 
disappearing mass is immediately replaced - the steady-state model of   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  7 
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continuous creation conceived by Hoyle and his co-authors—or the 
redshift is not at all produced by motion but by some other as yet 
undiscovered cause. It seems obvious, then, that such static models 
are not suitable, in that they do not easily account for Hubble’s law. 
Or don’t they? Adequate models are the tired-light models that have 
been introduced several times in history. They never lasted long 
because of a lack of detailed physical mechanisms that could be 
checked in laboratory and that could describe all the interactions, 
whenever the Doppler-Fizeau effect is a well-known laboratory fact. 
But recent work by LaViolette (1985, 1986) using subquantum 
kinetics, and by Pecker & Vigier (1986) through studying interactions 
between photons and a Dirac vacuum, might well revive the 
consideration of tired-light mechanics. 
Another very interesting idea is Segal’s highly developed 
“chronogeometry” (1976). Segal believes that a causally oriented 
space-time must be the basis of the definition of time sequences. To 
introduce into it such notions as observer, clock and rod, which 
generalize Special Relativity, it is natural to assume and exploit group 
invariance theories. This broad definition of time sequences allows 
one to define two times—the locally valid t, and t, valid at large 
scales, and their introduction is necessary to impose a causally 
asymmetric space-time. Although I can hardly describe this theory in 
all its mathematical aspects, its consequences can be tested. The 
strangest consequence is a “square law” redshift-distance relation. 
Redshift is a measurement of the difference between the two times of 
a galaxy and of the observer, and Segal’s “universal cosmos” is 
locally tangential to the local Minkowski space-time. Nicoll and Segal 
(1980) have shown that this seems indeed to be the case, but a strong 
opposition claims that the statistical samples were not valid. It seems 
actually that local motions within the local group and the local 
supercluster are by far too large to allow this criticism to be   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  8 
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unambiguously valid. Moreover, distance determination methods 
implicitly assume the linear law, to which the results must adhere. 
But at least Segal’s prediction is more compatible with the 
observed distribution of quasar redshifts than are classical theories. In 
addition, Segal explains background radiation as the result of 
interaction between the light from distant galaxies and the medium 
traversed by it. We should say that the location of various solar 
apexes and the distribution of velocities towards it give the 
background radiation a quasi-local character, which is justified both 
by Segal’s theory and by tired-light mechanisms. I should mention 
recent work by Segal and by Roscoe (unpublished) as new 
developments in chronogeometry. 
A cosmology based upon a variation in the physical constants with 
time was proposed in the late thirties by Dirac (1937) and was 
renewed, amongst others, by Canuto and Hsieh (1979, 1980, 1981). 
Notably, the variation of G with time would induce a redshift and its 
value could allow computation of Hubble’s rate of expansion. Some 
years ago the analysis of Earth and Moon motions (strongly 
depending upon the astronomical theory of perturbations) gave an 
apparent basis to this theory, but was later shown to be in error. It was 
also shown that up to a large value of redshift, the constants e, h, c, me 
are actually constants; the fine structure constant is constant in the 
totality of the observed universe. Thus, there is not much to connect 
the theory to; but we might mention that it predicts the background 
radiation just as well as any other theory. 
The value of proofs 
Background radiation has been a strong argument for the standard Big 
Bang cosmology. It is true that in the years 1948-54, Gamow, 
independently and then together with Alpher and Herman, developed   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  9 
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the idea of a hot Big Bang, which explained the chemical composition 
of the universe, as the result of a sort of quasi-metallurgic tempering, 
that could freeze-in the chemical composition of the Universe at the 
time (roughly speaking) of the decoupling of matter and radiation. As 
a by-product, the three authors predicted the existence of fossil 
radiation and gave various estimations, which themselves were wrong 
because based on incorrect values for the main parameters. 
But it is also true that, at the same time, Finlay-Freundlich (1953, 
1954) published four papers and Max Born (1954) two others, as 
comments on the former, and all developed the idea of some as yet 
undefined tired-light mechanism. They went on to predict the 
existence of a background radiation of about 2 K; and Born added in a 
foot-note that this radiation might be observed by the newly 
developed radio telescopes. Our problem then is that two completely 
different theories predicted beforehand background radiation before it 
was detected; hence, background radiation cannot be a bona fide test, 
no matter what errors might be detected in the analyses leading to the 
prediction! In other words, for any such theory, the predictive power 
is not a sufficient argument. Actually, practically all cosmological 
theories (chronogeometry: or changes in physical constants, or tired-
light mechanisms) predict or explain a background radiation of 3 K. 
One may criticize the artificial character of these deductions; one 
might not be convinced. At the least, it proves that the existence of 
background radiation is no “proof” for a cosmological theory; and this 
is true as much for the hierarchical universe as for background 
radiation. Some “facts of cosmological significance” can be 
accounted for by different theories, then they prove nothing!   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  10 
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Difficulties with the Big Bang 
Early ideas about the Big Bang originated from two different areas: 
Hubble’s discovery and the Friedmann-Lemaitre non-static solutions 
of the GR equations for a non-empty universe. The latter gave way at 
a certain epoch in the past to a singularity that could be determined 
knowing some observed factors, in particular Hubble’s rate of 
expansion. This singularity creates problems, however. And Professor 
Rees’s paper discusses it. To his expose I would like to add only my 
concern with the definition of time, because the classical definition 
underlies all GR equations. 
The standard Big Bang theories can no longer be considered 
satisfactory, even though, at its blooming, it seemed “the best in the 
best of all the possible worlds.” The GR equations, which were 
conveniently simplified by Friedmann by taking out the superfluous 
cosmological constant, led to simple models. These models then 
admit, as a maximum value of the age of the Universe, the so-called 
“Hubble age,” which is derived from a simple extrapolation of 
Hubble’s present and local rate of expansion. One’s love of simplicity 
was in essence well satisfied, but flaws couldn’t help but appear. 
First of all, Hubble’s rate of expansion was disputed then as now. 
Between the school of Sandage and Tammann who constantly 
reduced the Hubble rate and hence increased the “Hubble age” to 
values on the order of 18 to 20 billions of years, and the school of de 
Vaucouleurs and others, who found a higher rate of expansion that 
implied a smaller age, say 10 billions of years, the battle has not 
ended. The age of 18 billions agreed at least with whatever else we 
knew about the Galaxy. Let us quote Sandage (1975) himself, in the 
last sentence of the last chapter of the last book of the epoch-making 
series “Stars and Stellar Systems,” edited in the sixties and early 
seventies by Kuiper and Middlehurst:   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  11 
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This, plus the evidence that the Universe evolves (equality 
of age of other galaxies, similarity of H
–1 and the age of 
chemical elements, and the possible observation of the 
time horizon for the birth of quasars), is consistent with 
the view that a universal creation event did, in fact, occur. 
This was true, for the older globular clusters were 15-17 billions 
years old, and everything was still nice and clean. 
The trouble is that de Vaucouleurs’ value seems now more correct 
than Sandage’s; the age of globular clusters has probably been 
underestimated, as inferred from progress in the theory of stellar 
evolution, after taking turbulent diffusion into account. Hence the 
Friedmann models cannot be considered valid anymore, and the 
cosmological constant must be reintroduced. The need for explaining 
the isotropy of background radiation has also led to an “inflationary” 
universe. So the simple model has moved progressively into a very 
complicated one, as one ad hoc assumption after another was added; 
and despite an already quite sophisticated construction, many 
questions remained unanswered. Occam is left to cry in his grave over 
the need for “too many epicycles.” 
Of course, this is no problem for those who have faith in the Big 
Bang. There are ways to squeeze more parameters into the equations, 
to invent inflationary models, and to keep the Big Bang alive in some 
modified version. It is not a happy evolution. Starting with the very 
simple Big Bang, an idea full indeed of metaphysical connotations, 
one has since elaborated on it in order to justify it at the expense of 
simplicity. A veritable Procrustean bed! But our suspicion about the 
quality of proofs leads us to consider that the cosmological problem is 
still wide open to research and controversy. Although the inflationary 
version of the Big Bang is likely to be the most widely accepted   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  12 
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model nowadays, I would hate to see research limited to its 
elaboration. 
At this stage the reader should remember that any cosmological 
view is strongly influenced, whether one wants it or not, by 
metaphysical preconceptions. Einstein wanted a static universe for 
quasi-metaphysical reasons; but on the other side, as early as 1951, 
His Holiness Pius the XIIth (1951) said, almost verbatim, that “the 
Big Bang is the Fiat Lux.” Of course, they were both rather poor 
theologians, and St. Thomas of Aquinus (around 1270) would have 
smiled at their comments! But it does not alter my point. Hannes 
Alfven (1976) explicitly considered the Big Bang at most a 
“wonderful myth”, and I am tempted to agree. More recently, 
Narlikar (1986) stressed the implausibility of a singular point in the 
evolution of the universe. We are still far from being able to say what 
happened up there and before, so that all avenues are still open and I 
can only advise the reader against any dogmatic attitude in the field. 
Visit to Flatland and multi-dimensional 
universes 
Meanwhile the mathematicians’ imagination is blooming with 
marvels, and fantastic topologies can always be constructed. Are 
these fantasies (a fantasy, being “something which can be thought of,” 
does exist of course) suitable for describing the “real physical world”? 
“Si notre vue s’arrête la, que l’imagination passe outre; elle se lassera 
plutôt de concevoir, que la nature de fournir”. (Pascal) 
It was already clear in the last century that non-Euclidian 
geometries would not be easy to understand using common sense 
alone. And this difficulty led E.A. Abbott to write his account of the 
“Flatland”  - by a square  - even before H. Poincaré’s popular “La 
Science et l’Hypothese.” In this fantastic two-dimensional country,   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  13 
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the landscapes are strange. If, for instance, three-dimensional objects 
were to cross this space, they would appear from nothing and 
disappear into a vacuum, which has been used by science-fiction 
writers to predict the visits of strangers from another dimension. And 
it leads  logically to the question of how many dimensions has our 
physical space, the space of the real world? 
The usual three-plus-one dimensional space-time has been 
generally considered suitable for describing the astronomical 
universe. But for the microscopic universe, it seems quite appropriate 
to adopt a more complex description. Could it be possible to have a 
three-plus-one dimensional world imbedded in a three-plus-more-
than-one dimensional universe? 
I wonder whether this analogy can really be pushed forward too 
much. Indeed, we know that there can be no planar flatland imbedded 
in our space. Even the flatter animals, such as the stinkbug, are truly 
three-dimensional; their sight is three-dimensional, as are their 
sensations, even though they can move only on a plane or even along 
a given line, or even not move at all as is true of plants and minerals. 
Truly enough, the projection into a two-dimensional space of some 
impossible three-dimensional configurations might make them appear 
real as do Max Escher’s suggestive drawings. But seeing these 
structures on some etching or photograph in two dimensions does not 
make them more real if reconstructed in a three-dimensional 
landscape. They are truly impossible! Holograms may also be both 
real and impossible. 
Of course, one has tried to get rid of some of the difficulties in 
cosmological thinking by constructing strange topologies,  e.g., by 
thinking of the universe as a Riemann surface (of a high order) with 
loops, holes, tubes, and a multiple connectedness, but I am not quite 
sure there is any need for these fantasies. That mathematicians can   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  14 
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fantasize about these situations does not imply that they can even 
exist in reality. 
But to describe the microscopic universe, it does seem necessary to 
bring in some multi-dimensional space that implies a whole closed 
geometry around each point of the three-plus-one dimensional space 
to represent particle properties. As early as the twenties, Klein and 
Kaluza (cf. Freedmann, Van Nieuwenhuizen, 1985) have introduced 
similar considerations; and they have been developed further by 
Green and Schwarz (1984, 1985), among others, leading to the so-
called “superstring” models of particles that replace the point-like 
description of a particle by a multidimensional description. Particles 
are then associated with vibrations that occur along the strings. The 
theory behind it all can predict a finite but large number of elementary 
particles, but it is still being developed. But this multi-dimensional 
geometry may only be considered as a tool, since it requires a large 
number of parameters. And it is not identical to a geometrical 
description in that it still includes three spatial dimensions, one time 
dimension and six extra dimensions, all of which can be treated 
together as ten coordinates (in a way similar to general relativity) to 
represent the coupling of the material content of the universe with its 
space-time geometry. 
Needless to say, each of these theories will take its place in all 
future attempts to describe the physics of the early standard universe, 
if there ever was such a thing, and in the various trends towards a 
GUT. For this the treatment of complicated gauge symmetry groups 
[such as SO(32]) is needed. But whatever the issue of this research, it 
will neither be settled by tomorrow nor necessarily offer any clear-cut 
choice between cosmological models.   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  15 
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The anthropic principle 
Professor Rees’s account is interesting in many ways. First it shows 
that Professor Rees, a prudent promoter of this new avenue of 
thinking, has been somewhat mellowing his point of view. In their 
1979 review paper, Carr and Rees conclude: 
Even if all apparently anthropic coincidences could be 
explained in this way, it would still be remarkable that the 
relationships dictated by physical theory happened also to 
be propitious for life. 
Now he tells us that: “the anthropic principle cannot claim to be a 
scientific explanation in the proper sense.” No, it does not, indeed. It 
reminds me of the famous eighteenth century naivety of Bernardin de 
Saint-Pierre, who seriously claimed that cantaloupes were divided 
into sections so that they could be eaten in family dinners, or that the 
fleas were black in order to be more easily plucked off white skin. 
This goes much beyond anthropomorphism and is linked to 
philosophical thinking. about “final causes” and “prime causes.” The 
appearance of finality certainly can exist but only on earth when 
looking at the evolution and adaptation of animals: birds have wings, 
so that they could fly. No matter what one claims about the anthropic 
principle, it cannot help but be so deeply affected by prior 
metaphysics that I will find it hard to agree to its being called 
scientific fact. 
Professor Rees’s suggestion is to consider separately, independent 
of the inherent teleology, the idea that beyond our universe, built as it 
is, with our values of the coupling constants, there may exist, as 
suggested by Everett (1957) or Wheeler(1971), other universes in 
different forms. Are they able to interact with ours? If not, I have 
nothing to say; I could even claim I could not care less! And if so,   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  16 
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then how? This of course would mean that the universe as a whole 
contains several smaller universes; one easily observable, while the 
others interact with it. This would also modify completely the 
thermodynamics of our own universe, no longer an isolated system. 
I must say that I am reluctant to get involved in so many subtle 
possibilities. Indeed, the very fact that we can conceive of a principle 
of anthropic selection contains in itself a basic contradiction. That we 
can conceive any thing, along with its contrary, shows the high degree 
of evolution we have achieved; and this in itself seems to more or less 
exclude the possibility that the universe has been selected for its 
convenience for humans. And the same can be said for any other 
species that has existed or will exist, be it able to observe consciously 
the universe, or not. 
Another idea I am reluctant to agree to is that man can be inserted 
logically into the chain of hierarchized structures, as has been 
suggested by Carr and Rees in 1979, for the size ratio of the different 
elements in the chain is much too simple:  e.g. man = (planet x 
atom)
1/2; planet = (Universe x atom)
1/2. Since each element in the 
chain (why are some elements suppressed?) constitutes a continuum 
of values (in the animal realm from the flea to the whale), how can 
these continua be introduced into these magic non-dimensional 
ratios? This seems to me more a resurgence of a pre-Copernican 
attitude and its extension to the scale of the presently known universe, 
than a bona fide scientific discussion. 
I nonetheless feel that divergences between Professor Rees and 
myself are less severe than it may appear. I am perhaps more open 
than he to cosmological models that do not imply temporal singularity 
and less tolerant than he of excursions outside the outer boundaries of 
science: I am somewhat worried when seeing theological thinking 
entering the scientific realm! But in either case, as long as one is 
willing to keep to the observed and proven facts, there is no reason   Apeiron, No. 2, February 1988  17 
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why we should not speculate about the world. The only real danger 
would be in confusing this provisional, imaginary world, which may 
at any time lead to either good or bad theories, with physical reality. 
A working hypothesis is not a theory but only a starting point, and 
much remains to be done afterwards. Meanwhile, and perhaps 
forever, the basic question remains: how can the “real world” be 
described, and what is the appropriate mathematics to do it? (I am 
grateful to Drs. Collin, Demaret, Narlikar, Schatzman, Schneider and 
Vigier for enlightening discussions, and to Joli Adams for the 
English). 
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